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OPINION
                    
BARRY, Circuit Judge
Appellant Brian Daniels appeals from a final order of the District Court denying
his motion to vacate, set aside, or correct his sentence under 28 U.S.C. § 2255.  We
previously affirmed, on direct appeal, Daniels’s conviction for violent crime in aid of
racketeering.  We now find that even if we erred, there is no manifest injustice given the
concurrent sentence imposed for that conviction.  Accordingly, we will affirm.
I.
Darnell Doss was a supplier of illegal narcotics in the State College, Pennsylvania
area.  He employed his girlfriend, Rachel Brooks, and another young woman, Linden
Levey, as dealers.  Levey and Brooks shared an apartment in State College.  In late June
1999, following a series of police raids on houses out of which Doss sold drugs, Doss
went to Levey’s and Brooks’s apartment and complained that he was “broke.”  On several
occasions, he stated that he wanted to find someplace from which he could steal large
     1  Daniels conceded on direct appeal that the quantity of marijuana was said to be ten
pounds.  (App. at 162a n.5.)
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quantities of drugs and cash to revive his faltering drug trafficking business. 
On June 30, 1999, Daniels accompanied his cousin, Eugene Randolph (a/k/a
Eugene Sales), to a party at Levey’s and Brooks’s apartment.  There, Daniels was
introduced to Levey, Brooks, Doss, Donald Shank, Sara Eksteen, and Tamara Billet. 
They all smoked marijuana and drank, and Doss again expressed his desire to rob
someone—he needed to make a “come up,” which meant that he needed to acquire a large
amount of money in a short period of time.  There is no evidence, however, that Doss
explicitly stated in Daniels’s presence that the reason Doss needed money was to shore up
his drug trafficking business.
In response to Doss’s inquiries, Shank stated that he knew of an apartment in “the
Lofts” at University Terrace containing a large amount of marijuana and cash in a safe. 
Levey recalled that this apartment was said to contain $10,000 in cash and eight pounds
of Kind Bud marijuana, a stronger variety of marijuana with a high street value.1  Eksteen
told Doss that she had been to the apartment in question, and provided him with an
address.  As the plan to rob the apartment took shape, Daniels offered to participate “for
fun.”  (App. at 34a.)  He also agreed to carry Doss’s handgun.
At approximately 2:00 A.M. on the morning of July 1, 1999, Levey drove Doss
and Daniels to “the Lofts” apartment complex, where the two men proceeded to the
apartment indicated by Eksteen.  Three Pennsylvania State University students, Jacob J.
4Schmader, Patricia A. Bricker, and Amanda R. Pfaff, were living in the apartment at the
time and were awakened by the sound of Doss and Daniels pounding on their front door. 
When there was no answer, Doss and Daniels left.
Doss and Daniels soon returned, however, this time in a car driven by Brooks. 
Shortly after 4:00 A.M., Schmader, Bricker, and Pfaff were again awakened by pounding
on their door.  This time, Doss and Daniels kicked in the door and forcibly entered the
apartment.
After issuing a series of threats at gunpoint and ordering the students to be quiet,
Doss and Daniels demanded that the students show them the upstairs loft portion of the
apartment and tell them where the safe and “weed” were located.  Schmader and Bricker
offered their wallets to the intruders, but Daniels and Doss persisted in their demands for
the safe and “weed,” repeatedly threatening the students with bodily injury or death. 
Daniels, who held the gun, began to focus his attention on Schmader, pointing the gun in
Schmader’s face and “pistol whipping” him on the top of his head.
Schmader tried to tell Doss and Daniels that the apartment did not contain a safe or
“weed,” and Bricker and Pfaff offered to give them their computer, television, and VCR. 
Unappeased, Daniels placed the muzzle of the gun in Schmader’s mouth and warned, “If
you think this is a joke, I’ll kill you, I’ll blow your head off.”  Daniels then struck
Schmader in the face with the gun, breaking his nose. 
Schmader told Doss and Daniels that he and his house mates were not drug
dealers, but that the neighbors were.  Upon hearing this, Daniels told Doss to “check it.” 
5The students then heard Doss and Daniels rummaging through drawers and under the bed
in the loft.  When they were finished, Daniels told the students to put their heads down
and not to move or they would be shot, emphasizing his instruction by “clicking” the
hammer of the gun.  Doss and Daniels left the apartment.
After they left, the students called 9-1-1.  They found a red Polo shirt on the floor
of the kitchen and a bra hanging from a railway beneath the apartment’s balcony, neither
of which belonged to any of the occupants of the apartment.  Bricker discovered that
some jewelry was missing from the dresser in the loft.  Police responding to the 9-1-1 call
found a black duffel bag outside the apartment containing a letter from one Tanna
Hockenberry to Brooks.  They later learned that the Polo shirt and bra belonged to
Brooks.  The connection to Brooks presumably led police to identify Doss and Daniels.  
On February 9, 2000, a federal grand jury sitting in Harrisburg returned a five-
count superseding indictment charging Daniels with brandishing a firearm during and in
relation to a drug trafficking crime, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 924(c)(1)(A)(ii) (Count I);
conspiracy to brandish a firearm during and in relation to a drug trafficking crime, in
violation of 18 U.S.C. § 924(o) (Count II); possession of a firearm by an unlawful drug
user, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(3) (Count III); committing a violent crime in aid
of racketeering activity, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1959(a)(3) (Count IV); and witness
tampering, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1512(b)(1) (Count V).  Daniels entered a plea of
not guilty, and the case proceeded to trial.  On May 3, 2000, after a three-day trial, a jury
found Daniels guilty on all counts.
6At the July 27, 2000 sentencing hearing, the District Court sentenced Daniels to a
term of 84 months on Count I, and concurrent terms of 87 months on each of Counts II,
III, IV, and V.  The District Court ordered that the sentence for Count I run consecutive to
the terms for Counts II, III, IV, and V, for a total term of imprisonment of 171 months,
followed by five years of supervised release.  We affirmed the judgment of conviction in
a non-precedential, per curiam opinion and judgment dated September 26, 2002.  See
United States v. Daniels, 48 F. App’x 409 (3d Cir. 2002) (“Daniels I”).  
On November 29, 2003, Daniels timely filed a motion to vacate, set aside, or
correct his sentence under 28 U.S.C. § 2255 and an amended motion on July 26, 2004. 
The District Court denied Daniels’s motion in an opinion and order dated January 27,
2005.  Daniels filed a motion for reconsideration, which the District Court also denied. 
On February 22, 2005, he timely filed an application for a certificate of appealability
(“COA”).  On September 12, 2005, we granted a COA as to three issues:
(1) whether trial counsel was ineffective for failing to make a specific
motion for acquittal on the 18 U.S.C. § 1959(a) count; and (2) whether trial
counsel was ineffective for failing to object to jury instructions on the §
1959(a) count; and (3) whether appellate counsel was ineffective for failing
to effectively raise the issue of the sufficiency of the evidence on the §
1959(a) count and for failing to raise the jury instruction issue.
(App. at 17a.)  
II. Jurisdiction and Standard of Review 
We exercise jurisdiction over Daniels’s appeal from the District Court’s denial of
his § 2255 motion pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §§ 2253 and 1291. 
7The government argues that Daniels I constitutes the law of the case and precludes
a collateral challenge to the sufficiency of the evidence as to Count IV—and, by
extension, the fault Daniels finds with trial and appellate counsel for failure to challenge
the sufficiency of the evidence.  We give plenary consideration to determining, in the first
instance, whether the law-of-the-case doctrine governs resolution of an appeal.  See, e.g.,
In re City of Phila. Litig., 158 F.3d 711, 718 (3d Cir. 1998).
III. Discussion
A. Daniels I and the Law of the Case Doctrine
The law of the case doctrine generally forbids one panel of an appellate court from
reconsidering questions that another panel decided on a prior appeal in the same case.  In
re City of Phila., 158 F.3d at 717.  This doctrine is prudential and does not apply to dicta
or issues not actually decided, either expressly or by implication, in a prior appeal.  Id. at
718.  Where an issue was actually decided in a prior appeal, however, we may reconsider
that issue only in extraordinary circumstances, such as where “(1) new evidence is
available; (2) a supervening new law has been announced; or (3) the earlier decision was
clearly erroneous and would create manifest injustice.”  Pub. Interest Research Group of
N.J., Inc. v. Magnesium Elektron, Inc., 123 F.3d 111, 117 (3d Cir. 1997).  Thus, two
considerations guide the exercise of our discretion as to whether the law of the case
doctrine should be applied: (1) whether the prior determination was dictum or the issue in
question was not actually decided; and, if not, (2) whether the instant appeal presents one
of the recognized “extraordinary circumstances” that would warrant our reconsideration
     2  “Enterprise,” as used in § 1959(a), broadly includes “any union or group of
individuals associated in fact although not a legal entity, which is engaged in, or the
activities of which affect, interstate or foreign commerce.”  18 U.S.C. § 1959(b)(2). 
“Racketeering activity” includes “any act or threat involving . . . dealing in a controlled
substance . . ., which is chargeable under State law and punishable by imprisonment for
more than one year.”  18 U.S.C. § 1961(1)(A); see also 18 U.S.C. § 1959(b)(1). 
Pennsylvania law specifies a minimum term of two years’ imprisonment for possession
with intent to distribute as little as one gram of heroin.  18 Pa. Cons. Stat. Ann. §
7580(a)(7)(1).  (See App. at 22a-23a (testifying that Doss supplied heroin to Levey and
Brooks for sale).)
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of the previously-decided issue.  In re City of Phila., 158 F.3d at 718.
This appeal concerns Daniels’s conviction on Count IV for committing a violent
crime in aid of racketeering in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1959, dubbed the “VICAR”
statute.  Section 1959(a), in relevant part, makes it unlawful for a person to commit a
violent crime “for the purpose of gaining entrance to or maintaining or increasing [his or
her] position in an enterprise engaged in racketeering activity.”  Subsection (a)(3), the
provision under which Daniels was convicted, establishes a statutory maximum of 20
years imprisonment where the violent crime in question was assault with a dangerous
weapon or assault resulting in serious bodily injury.  18 U.S.C. § 1959(a)(3).  Therefore,
in addition to proving the existence of a racketeering enterprise, the government was
required to prove that Daniels committed an assault with a dangerous weapon or an
assault resulting in serious bodily injury, and that he did so for the purpose of gaining
entrance to or maintaining or increasing his position in Doss’s racketeering enterprise.2 
18 U.S.C. § 1959(a).  The motive element does not require proof that the defendant acted
solely or primarily out of a desire for self-promotion.  United States v. Concepcion, 983
9F.2d 369, 381 (2d Cir. 1992).  It is satisfied “if the jury could properly infer that the
defendant committed his violent crime because he knew it was expected of him by reason
of his membership in the enterprise or that he committed it in furtherance of that
membership.”  Id.; see also United States v. Carson, 455 F.3d 336, 369 (D.C. Cir. 2006).
On his direct appeal, both in his counsel’s brief and in his pro se brief, Daniels
argued that the government’s evidence was insufficient to prove that he committed an
assault for the purpose of enhancing his position in an enterprise engaged in racketeering
activity.  Counsel argued that with regard to Count IV, “the Government has totally failed
to show that [Daniels] engaged in any type of enterprise to enhance his status within a
gang, an association or a conspiracy.”  (App. at 152a.)  In his pro se supplemental brief,
Daniels elaborated on this argument.  He contended that the evidence clearly showed that
he met Doss for the first time on the evening of June 30, 1999, that “while in an
intoxicated state,” he (Daniels) agreed to commit a robbery merely “for fun,” and that the
government failed to prove that he sought to be involved in Doss’s drug trafficking
activities.  (Id. at 161a-162a.)  While effectively conceding that he knew that one object
of the robbery was to obtain a large quantity of marijuana, he suggested that he “could
have very well believed that the alleged marijuana . . . would be utilized to supply the
party or even another party like the one he attended.”  (Id. at 162a.)
We rejected these arguments in Daniels I.  First, we found that the government’s
evidence was sufficient to permit a reasonable jury to find the existence of a racketeering
enterprise.  Daniels, 48 F. App’x at 416-17.  Second, and more significantly for purposes
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of this appeal, we found that the government’s evidence was sufficient to prove that
Daniels acted to “‘maintain or increase’” his position within the racketeering enterprise. 
Id. at 417 (quoting United States v. Tse, 135 F.3d 200, 206 (1st Cir. 1998), and
Concepcion, 983 F.2d at 381).
The evidence showed that Doss told [Daniels] that the reason he wanted to
commit the robbery was to shore up Doss’s drug distribution business, that
[Daniels] agreed to assist Doss with full knowledge of Doss’s goals, and
that [Daniels] assaulted Schmader to facilitate the commission of the
robbery.  A rational trier of fact could find based on such evidence that
[Daniels] committed the assault for the purpose of furthering Doss’s ends.
Id.  We therefore considered and rejected Daniels’s challenge to the sufficiency of the
evidence against him as to Count IV.  Id. 
Daniels does not attack Daniels I as dictum or contend that we did not actually
decide the issue of the sufficiency of the evidence as to Count IV.  Rather, he urges us to
find that two exceptional circumstances preclude us from applying the law of the case
doctrine.  First, he argues that Daniels I was simply wrong because there was no evidence
in the record that he knew of Doss’s drug trafficking activities at the time of the robbery. 
Second, he points to newly available evidence in the form of an affidavit from Doss in
which Doss attests that he never discussed with Daniels the reason he wanted to commit a
robbery.  
B. The Holding of Daniels I Is Not Clearly and Manifestly Unjust
The law of the case doctrine “is not a ‘barrier to correction of judicial error.’” 
Schultz v. Onan Corp., 737 F.2d 339, 345 (3d Cir. 1984) (quoting Loumar, Inc. v. Smith,
     3  For the same reason, we need not consider whether the Doss affidavit constitutes
new evidence that would compel our reversing the conviction on Count IV because even
if it does, Doss’s concurrent sentences on Counts II, III, and V ensure that, aside from the
$100 special assessment imposed on Count IV, the outcome would remain the same. 
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698 F.2d 759, 762 (5th Cir. 1983)).  The threshold for finding clear error and manifest
injustice, however, is high.  See Laffey v. Northwest Airlines, Inc., 740 F.2d 1071, 1082-
83 (D.C. Cir. 1984).  We may disregard the law of the case only when we have “‘a clear
conviction of error’ with respect to a point of law on which [our] previous decision was
predicated.”  Fogel v. Chestnutt, 668 F.2d 100, 109 (2d Cir. 1981) (quoting Zdanok v.
Glidden Co., 327 F.2d 944, 953 (2d Cir. 1964)).  “‘[M]ere doubt on our part is not enough
to open the point for full reconsideration.’”  Id. (quoting White v. Higgins, 116 F.2d 312,
317 (1st Cir. 1940)).     
We need not decide whether we erred when we concluded that there was sufficient
evidence in the record that Daniels knew of Doss’s drug trafficking activities on the night
and in the early morning of June 30 – July 1, 1999 and that Daniels knew Doss’s reason
for wanting to commit the robbery because even if we erred, there is no manifest injustice
given the concurrent sentence imposed on Count IV.3  More specifically, because Daniels
received an 87-month sentence on each of Counts II, III, IV, and V, the sentences to be
served concurrently, a decision not to reverse Count IV, even if reversal was otherwise
warranted, would have virtually no effect.  
C. Ineffective Assistance of Counsel
We must next consider whether the District Court erred in finding that Daniels
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failed to satisfy either prong of the Strickland standard.  (See App. at 9a.)  Our review is
plenary.  Duncan, 256 F.3d at 200.  We need not reach the issue of counsel’s performance
where the defendant has failed to establish prejudice.  See Rolan v. Vaughn, 445 F.3d 671,
678 (3d Cir. 2006); United States v. Cross, 308 F.3d 308, 315 (3d Cir. 2002).  
To satisfy the prejudice prong of Strickland, “[t]he defendant must show that there
is a reasonable probability that, but for counsel’s unprofessional errors, the result of the
proceeding would have been different.”  Strickland, 466 U.S. at 694; see also Sistrunk v.
Vaughn, 96 F.3d 666, 670 (3d Cir. 1996) (paraphrasing same).  “A reasonable probability
is one ‘sufficient to undermine confidence in the outcome.’”  United States v. Gray, 878
F.2d 702, 710 (3d Cir. 1989) (quoting Strickland, 466 U.S. at 694).  “This standard ‘is not
a stringent one;’ it is less demanding than the preponderance standard.”  Jermyn v. Horn,
266 F.3d 257, 282 (3d Cir. 2001) (quoting Baker v. Barbo, 177 F.3d 149, 154 (3d Cir.
1999)).  A reviewing court must consider the totality of the evidence at trial; “‘a verdict
or conclusion only weakly supported by the record is more likely to have been affected by
errors than one with overwhelming record support.’”  Rolan, 445 F.3d at 682 (quoting
Gray, 878 F.2d at 711).  
For the same reason that there is no “manifest injustice,” there is no prejudice
under the Strickland test.  
IV.  Conclusion
We will affirm the order of the District Court.
